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THE TAX LEGISLATION AGAINST
CONGLOMERATES - THE CASE
AGAINST THE TAX
LEGISLATION
GEORGE

H.

JEWELL, JR.*

With the coming of Spring 1969, the bears emerged snarling on Wall
Street and a great many people took severe beatings in the stock market.
Somewhere a scapegoat had to be found; nominated without opposition and
elected by acclamation was that one time darling of the investment community - the conglomerate. Once the culprit was located, no form of
punishment was too severe. Stick pins in his image; burn crosses on his lawn;
apply a bamboo shoot or two under his fingernails; and - most sadistic of
all - roast him upon the spit of federal income tax "reform."
The object of this article is to analyze the federal income tax movement against conglomerates -- to trace its conception, birth and development; to comment upon the validity of such an approach from a social and
economic vantage; and finally to note that the lawmakers have burdened
what is already the most complicated revenue raising system the world has
ever known with further complexities which cannot, because of the very
nature of our system, accomplish their goal. Considering the latter, the
Internal Revenue Code must apply equally to all corporations having similar
form and conducting similar business. There is no acceptable way to deny a
particular tax treatment to an organization labeled "conglomerate" without
also denying it to other organizations not wearing such an opprobrious label.
Nothing in the legislation has particular applicability to conglomerates;
perhaps such discriminatory legislation would be unconstitutional anyway.
It is simply time to stop brandishing this legislation as anti-conglomerate.
What we are really talking about, then, is the so-called take-over phenomenon. We are not talking about conglomerates at all, except that some
of the more notable take-overs have been consummated by conglomerates.
On the other hand, some very notable acquisitions have also been engineered
by nonconglomerates. The point is that until recently antitrust forces did
not move against conglomerate acquisitions, but did against congeneric ones.
To fill this gap, the House Ways and Means Committee set about attempting
to supply some kind of take-over prohibition in the form of tax legislation.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 contains four principal provisions affecting corporate acquisitions: section 411 of the Act adds new section 279 to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, denying an interest deduction in certain
cases;' section 412 of the Act amends Code section 453(b) to deny installment
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reporting where certain types of debt instruments are received in a sale; 2
sections 4133 and 4144 of the Act have to do with original issue discount and
convertible indebtedness repurchase premium. The first two of these will be
examined in detail.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The first hint that the corporate take-over was under tax siege was on
January 29, 1969, when the House Ways and Means Committee announced
that public hearings on tax reform were to commence on February 18. One
of the topics for consideration was "the tax treatment of bonds and debentures received for stock in a merger.'' 5 Of course, this could have meant
almost anything; the use of the word "received," however, led one to conclude that the tax treatment of the recipient was that being considered.
Installment reporting was the likely target (and apparently the only target
at that early date) since there had been indications that the Internal
Revenue Service was considering adopting the view that securities which
circulate in the market place should be treated like cash and taxed when
received rather than when sold or collected. Corporate tax counsel, however,
were almost uniformly of the view that any such position would have been
based more on prejudice than sound legal position. Consequently, the prospecti attending a number of major corporate acquisitions contained advice
that counsel was of the opinion that the recipient of the debt securities was
entitled to treat the securities as "evidences of indebtedness" within the
meaning of section 453. Thus, installment reporting was permitted if other
requirements were met.Sometime in February 1969, Chairman Wilbur Mills of the Ways and
Means Committee became more interested in anti-take-over legislation. It
has been suggested that it was about this time that he was visited by the
general counsel of B. F. Goodrich Company, which wasthen the subject of
a take-over effort by Northwest Industries.7 On February 10, Chairman Mills
announced that the study of debentures received for stock would include the
interest deduction of the issuer, as well as installment reporting.8
On February 24, while the hearings were barely starting, Chairman
Mills introduced H.R. 7489. 9 This bill, clearly "anti-raider" and little more,
Id. § 453(b) (amend).
s id. §§ ,1232(a), (b)(2) & 6049(c) (amend).
4 Id. § 249 (new).
5 Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Press Release No. 2
(Jan. 29, 1969).
,
6 See Berger & Kanter, Installment Reporting on Receipt of Bonds in Corporate Acquisition, 30 J. TAXATION 198 (1969).
7 O'Hanlon, Goodrich'sFour-Ply Defense, FORTUNE, July 1969, at 110, 113.
S Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1969, at 4, col. 2.
9 H.R. 7489, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). H.R. 7489 would have provided, in pertinent
part, that
If, pursuant to a plan (1) one corporation acquires stock of another corporation, and
(2) more than 35 percent of the consideration for the stock so acquired con2
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proposed that if a corporation acquired stock of another corporation and
over 35 percent of the consideration for the stock so acquired consisted of
debt or property attributable to borrowing, a part of the interest deduction
on this debt would be forfeited. The recipient would not be entitled to use
the installment method of reporting if he received bonds or debentures in
registered form or with coupons attached.
H.R. 7489 was obviously directed at the hostile take-over, as distinguished from the friendly one. Otherwise, why did the measure penalize only
the acquisition of stock, and not the acquisition of assets or the merger transaction? The reason is quite simple. To effect an asset acquisition or a merger,
the management of the company to be acquired must cooperate. The only
kind of take-over which can be used where management is unfriendly is the
stock acquisition, usually pursuant to a tender offer. A tax provision based
upon such a narrow distinction, with predominately private rather than
public purposes, has little to recommend it.
The next public pronouncements in this area came from the administration. President Nixon's message of April 21 was silent on this point,' 0 but
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Cohen's statement to the Ways and
Means Committee on April 22 indicated that the legislation proposed as an
interim program for 1969 would deal with "the tax problems of certain
corporate securities frequently associated with corporate acquisitions.' 'I
Secretary Cohen stated that the interest deduction was not the primary
motivation in debt acquisitions, and even if it were, the correct treatment
would be to deny the interest deduction only if the underlying obligation
were really equity rather than debt. On a broader scale, Secretary Cohen said
that the administration was interested in making a complete study of the
tax-free reorganization phenomenon to determine whether the present tax
laws offer a special inducement to combinations. The only measures intended for immediate passage were: (1) to deny installment reporting for
debt in registered form or with coupons attached; (2) to require accrual and
current reporting of bond discount; and (3) to disallow the deduction of the
part of bond repurchase premium attributable to a conversion feature.
sisted of evidence of indebtedness of the acquiring corporation or of other
property attributable to borrowing by the acquiring corporation, then the
amount which (but for this section) would be allowable to the acquiring corporation or to any other person as a deduction for any taxable year for interest paid
or accrued with respect to such evidences of indebtedness or other borrowing (or
with respect to any refinancing thereof) shall be reduced to the amount obtained by multiplying the amount of such interest by a fraction the numerator
of which is 35 percent and the denominator of which is the percentage arrived
at under paragraph (2).
The installment reporting change would have added to section 453(b), INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, a new paragraph reading
(3) RULE FOR APPLYING PARAGRAPH (2).-A bond or debenture issued
by a corporation or by a government or political subdivision thereof, with
interest coupons or in registered form, shall not be treated as an evidence of
indebtedness of the purchaser for purposes of paragraph (2) of this subsection.
10 HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESs., MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING TAX REFORM 1-4 (Comm. Print 1969).

11 Id. at 46, 73, 183.
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The Treasury approach thus recognized and validated the existing
framework and would have worked within it, along traditional lines. It at
once verified that an interest deduction is proper if the underlying security
is debt, and denied the validity of an attempt to differentiate between types
of debt. The strongest memory of a distinction between types of debt comes
from section 265,12 which denies the interest deduction on indebtedness
incurred or continued, to purchase or carry tax-exempt securities. The section has produced an administrative nightmare, with many still unresolved
questions remnining. However, if section 265 is necessary at all, the necessity
for it is at least of tax origin, which justifies it as a tax measure. A tax provision which would allow deduction of interest on some debts but deny it on
identical debts because issued in acquisitions is of antitrust or entrenched
management origin and has no justification as a tax measure.
During the Ways and Means Committee hearings, however, the
Treasury approach got lost. Contrary to the Treasury recommendations,
the Committee adopted, and the House passed, a bill directed at the interest
deduction. The House Bill denied a deduction for interest in excess of
$5 million per year in the case of bonds or debentures issued by a corporation to acquire stock in another corporation or to acquire at least twothirds of the assets of another corporation. The rule would apply, however,
only in the case of debt which is subordinated to the corporation's trade
creditors, is convertible into stock, and is issued by a corporation with a
debt-equity ratio greater than two-to-one, or with annual interest expense
not covered at least three times by projected earnings.' 8 Intricate rules are
14
established for determining projected earnings.
The House Bill reflected the emergence of a general antipathy to
corporate acquisitions of a taxable nature. It matters not under the House
Bill whether the acquisition is by way of a hostile take-over or not, for the
acquisition would fall within the provisions of the House Bill even
though it be by way of merger or asset acquisition, both of which require
the cooperation of management.
The Treasury's position that the true rule for disallowance of interest
should be based upon whether the underlying security is debt or equity
apparently served as the basis for the tests imposed, i.e., subordination, convertibility, and high debt-equity ratio. The tests are relevant to the question of whether the underlying security is debt or equity, based upon
whether the funds thus entrusted to the corporation are truly intended to be
repaid, or whether they are put at the risk of the business, as, for example,
by way of a second class of stock. Except for the lack of comprehensiveness,
tax theorists could have no quarrel with this general approach. The details,
however, are subject to a great deal of dispute, for example, whether a
two-to-one debt-equity ratio or a three times interest expense earnings
12

I.R.C. § 265.

1s House Version § 411.
14

Id.
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coverage is anything more than a punitive approach to the question. The
basic fallacy of the approach, however, from a theoretical tax standpoint,
is that the interest deduction is denied where these tests are met in the
case of bonds or debentures issued in a corporate acquisition, but is permitted where the same bonds or debentures are issued for general corporate
purposes.
INTEREST DEDUCTION

Consider the complexities which such a measure generates. Under
section 279(c)(2) a determination is made as of the last day of the taxable
year of the issuing corporation in which it issues an obligation to provide
consideration for an acquisition as to whether the obligation constitutes
"corporate acquisition indebtedness." If the indebtedness is determined to
be corporate acquisition indebtedness because it was issued to provide consideration for the acquisition of stock or assets of another corporation, if it
is subordinated to the claims of trade creditors, and if it is either convertible or part of an investment unit including a warrant, this indebtedness
remains corporate acquisition indebtedness as long as it is outstanding.
Presumably, the regulations issued pursuant to this section will provide that
indebtedness which is created to provide funds with which to refund or satisfy corporate acquisition indebtedness is itself corporate acquisition indebtedness. Thus, a very difficult problem of tracing will be created, with the
result being in many cases that the interest on a portion of future created
indebtedness will be non-deductible under section 279, but the balance of
such interest will not be tainted. What if corporate acquisition indebtedness
is satisfied out of general funds of the corporation, but in the year of
satisfaction the corporation issues several new debt securities bearing
differing rates of interest? Which of these is the replacement indebtedness
and what interest is to be disallowed as a deduction? What would be the
rule where one corporation acquires a portion of the assets of another
corporation for debt securities having a face amount of, say, $2 million,
there being no determination at the time of the value of the remaining
assets of the corporation? Query, whether two-thirds of the assets have
been acquired?
Financial reporting requirements for SEC purposes will undoubtedly
require a disclosure of whether the interest expense on a particular debt
is deductible for federal income tax purposes. At least, it would seem that
a person investigating a corporation with the prospect of acquiring some
of its stock is entitled to know whether the securities of the corporation
are regular in all respects, including the deductibility of interest paid
thereon, or whether they are of a hybrid type, the interest on which is not
deductible. Thus, another difficult problem will arise in close cases of making
an advance determination of whether a particular item of indebtedness is
corporate acquisition indebtedness or not.
The debt-equity ratio test must be satisfied as of the last day of the
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taxable year in which the corporation issues the debt securities. Unless the
acquisition is made late in the year, it will be virtually impossible to
plan, in close cases, for meeting the required ratio at the end of the year.
The projected earnings test does not involve a projection of earnings at
all. Projected earnings are defined by the statute to mean earnings for the
three years ending with the last day of the year in which the acquisition
is made. On the other hand, the interest costs to be compared with "projected earnings" include interest to be paid on the new securities. Thus,
one is comparing apples and oranges. The three-year period prior to the
last day of the year in which the acquisition is made would seem to have
no particular relevance to earnings of the corporation which can be expected
subsequent to the acquisition, during which time the interest in question is
going to be paid.
To add further complexity to confusion already compounded, even
though the debt-equity test and projected earnings tests are met in the
year in which an initial stock acquisition is made, if, in a subsequent year,
more stock is acquired, the tests must be met anew as of the last day of
that subsequent year or all indebtedness will have its interest deduction
disallowed, including interest on both the indebtedness issued in the subsequent year, perhaps to acquire only a small amount of additional stock,
as well as interest on the indebtedness incurred in connection with the initial acquisition.
The Senate Finance Committee 15 basically adopted the provisions of
the House Bill, although attempting to relax them somewhat.16 The Finance
Committee would have changed the debt-equity ratio to four-to-one and
the interest coverage requirement to two times, rather than three times.
The Bill as finally passed, however, reverted to the House version. One
Senate change which did stick makes it possible to pass the tests later if
not passed at first. Thus, even though the interest deduction is disallowed
because the debt-equity test or the earnings test was not met in the year of
issuance, the interest may later become deductible if both of these tests are
met for a period of at least three years."
The tax purpose most frequently recited is that the legislation will
avoid a loss of tax revenues because dividend paying stock is being replaced
by debt. The interest on debt is deductible by the payor, but dividends
on stock are not. The non-tax purpose most often heard is that the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code should not be oriented so as to encourage conglomerate acquisitions. The first of these purposes, the tax
purpose, would appear fallacious. The traditional reason for permitting
the deduction of interest is that the cost of capital is truly an expense of the
business, just as much as the cost of raw materials, and to preclude its
15 See Senate Version.

16 Id. § 411.
17 Tax Reform Act § 411, I.R.C. §

279.
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deduction would militate in the direction of a tax on gross income, a
concept never accepted in the United States. On the other hand, dividends
paid to the stockholders of a business represent merely a division of the
profits, as contrasted with an expense of doing business. Hence, dividends
have never been, and should not be, deductible by the payor corporation.
Working within this well-settled framework, there is little basis for an
argument that a transformation of a part of a corporation's capital stock
into debt, if that transformation is truly made, should require a change
in basic taxing concepts just to avoid a loss of revenues. One could easily
argue that the only basis for such a position would be that the government
must have some kind of vested right, once corporate stock is outstanding,
in requiring it to remain outstanding. Further fallacies with this argument
also exist. What of the acquisition of a corporation by the use of debt
securities where the acquired corporation has never paid dividends on its
stock? What if the corporation has no accumulated earnings and could not
pay dividends even if it wanted to?
What is overlooked is that the federal income tax authorities from
antiquity have fashioned a very carefully reasoned framework of case law,
regulations and rulings, differentiating between debt and equity, permitting
an interest deduction in the one case and preventing a dividend deduction
in the other. These debt versus equity rules apply whether or not an "acquisition" is involved. Interest has always been a legitimate deduction and it
should have been left that way. If mergers through the use of debt securities
are bad from a social or economic standpoint, they should be dealt with
under the antitrust laws by the Justice Department or the Federal Trade
Commission. If the antitrust laws are not adequate to take care of the cases
which are concerning the Congress, it is the antitrust laws which should
be changed, and not the tax laws. What started out as a simple little bill
to save entrenched management has turned into a monster which adds at
least three additional pages to an already bulging Internal Revenue Code,
pages which will have to be read and reread and explained by lawyers and
accountants to bewildered executives forever more. In effect this legislation
diverts us from the task at hand, namely, to devise a revenue system which
will operate fairly and equitably for all, will raise an appropriate amount
of money, and, of particular significance, will have a bland or neutral
effect upon business forms and transactions. Starting from where we are,
this is impossible, of course, but if a proposed tax measure clearly works
contra to these goals, it is bad legislation.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING

The installment reporting provisions are easier to understand.' 8 While
the House version contained a provision that to qualify for installment
reporting generally, payments received in the future would have to be
is Tax

Reform Act § 412, I.R.C. § 453(b).
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spread relatively evenly over the period of payment, this was removed by
the Senate Finance Committee, and the final bill does not contain such a
provision. The basic provision is to the effect that a bond or other evidence
of indebtedness issued by a corporation or a government or political subdivision thereof with interest coupons attached, in registered form, or in
any other form designed to render such bond or other evidence of indebtedness readily tradable on an established securities market, shall not be
treated as an evidence of indebtedness qualifying for installment reporting
under section 453.
While it violates the purpose and intended spirit with which the
installment reporting provisions were passed originally, there is no basic
objection to this amendment from a tax theory standpoint. What the
Congress giveth, it can take away. Without section 453, all obligations of
a purchaser would have to be valued in the year of receipt and reported as
income at that time. Amounts ultimately collected in excess of such value
would be taxable at ordinary rates. If incapable of ivaluation, deferral of
reporting would be possible until collection. The thing which has troubled
the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service through the
years is that bonds or debentures issued to many persons at the same time
in connection with the acquisition of stock or assets of a corporation bear
at best only a slight resemblance to the acquisition of the corner drug
store for an installment note payable $100 per month for 5 years.
Analyzed, however, there is no difference. A taxpayer has sold an asset,
and has not yet received his money for it. The Treasury has argued, yes,
this is true, but he could get his money at any time he wants it because the
bond or debenture he receives is readily marketable. The answer to this is
that the law already makes provision for this, because when a taxpayer
does utilize this right and does receive his money upon marketing the bond
or debenture, he pays a tax at that time.
Again, the question of whether bonds or debentures of this nature
have been used to make corporate acquisitions which are anti-social, or
which have bad economic effects, should indeed be immaterial to the
administration of the tax laws. These matters should be policed by the
antitrust authorities who presumably can distinguish between good and
bad mergers and can prevent the bad ones from being consummated. There
is no way for the tax laws to do this. The revenue system is a woefully,
ineffective and inadequate antitrust policing device.

